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The

is reversed.
Slwnk, .J., Sdwuer, .J., Spence, J., and

Carter,

did not

herein.

for a rehearing was denied December
J., and Schauer, ,J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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Dec. 5, 1958.]

Hcspondent, v. NEJ_~LAHD ROBERT
BERVE, Appellant.

[1] Criminal Law- Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-The
u~e

of confessions in a criminal prosecution obtained by force,
fenr,
of immunity or reward constitutes a denial of
due process of ]a w both under the federal and state Constitutions requiring a reversal of the conviction although other
evidence may be consistent "·ith guilt.
[2] Id.- Evidence- Confessions- Review.- It is a reviewing
court's duty to examine uncontradicted facts to determine indewhether the trial court's conclusion of voluntariness
of a confession was properly found.
[3] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Proof of Voluntary Character.The burden is on the prosecution to show that a confession was
voluntarily giYen without previous inducement, intimidation
or threat.
[ 4] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-The test for voluntariness of a confession is whether or not the accused exercised "mental freedom" in confessing or whether the confession
was the
of free choice; the slightest pressure,
whether by way of inducement to confess, or threat if confpssion is withheld, is sufficient to require exclusion of the
confession.

[1] :See Cal.Ju:r.2d, gvidence, § 422 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ '18:2 d seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 7, 11] Criminal Law, § 467; [2]
Criminal Law,§ 480; [3] Criminal Law,~ 469(1); [5, 6, 8, 9] Criminal Law,§ 4G7(11); [10] Criminal Law,§ 467(10).
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[5] !d.-Evidence-Confessions--Effect of Prior Inducements,I3efore a confession may he admitted in
the prosecution must show that such corrcive conditions ns once existed
JJO longer prevailed at the time the coufoRsion was uttered.

[6] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Effect of Prior Inducements.The prosecution failed to show that coercive conditions resulting from beatings and threats administered hy the victim's
husband and others in an attempt to force defendant to confess
to murder by abortion ceased to e:xi~t in defendant's mind at
the time he uttered his eonfession to pol ice officers, where
there was no showing that threats of his torturers that he
would be killed if he did not confess and that his pnrcnts would
be harmed if they aided him were obliterated before his confession, and where fear of his own life and those of his
parents, compounded by the effects of his exhausting torture
and his confused mental state, hovered over the accused during
this confession.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-'Where there are
threats of mob violence against an
a confession is
deemed coereed and invalid on due process grounds.

[8] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Effect of Prior Inducements.Defendant's confession to murder by abortion was not freely
and voluntarily given where the actual physical and psychological effects of a beating he a bsorbetl at the hands of the victim's
husband and others who kidnaped and tortured him were painfully fresh when he eonfessed to police offlcers, and where,
though there was no th)'eat of further violence by the police,
th('Y made llO effort to assuage his physical suffering by giving
him medical attention, opportunity to rest, or even sufficient
\Yater to drink or wash himself, sinee elements of despair,
fatigue, eraving for comprmionship, identifying one's interrogator as a friend and source of aid, and
of guilt
werP pn's<'nL in :1 erudP,
nl
faetors in invalidating his ronfession.

[9] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Effect of Prior Inducements.-Testimony of defendant nt the trial in 'Whirh he asserted his
relief at being reseued hy police officers from the victim's
vengeful relatives who were beating and threat<"ning him in
an attempt to fon·e him to c-onfess to nmrdPr by abortion was
not susceptible to the inferenee that the subse.quent confession
was voluntary, where the purpo,;e of the two-hour inquisition
was to instill iu defendant such fear for his own safety and
that of his parents that he would confess to proper authoritie.,;
although removed from immediate danger; momentary police
sanetuary eould not still deJ\•ndant's terror unless accompanied by promises o£ C'itective police protection.
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[10] !d.-Evidence-Confessions-Person to Whom Made as Affecting Voluntariness.~~-The mere f:wt that coercion
defendant to eonfess
civilians, not by the police to
whom the confession was made, does not render the confession
admissible; the prohibition
the use o [ involuntary
confessions is designed not
as a regulation of the conduct
of police officers, but also to insure that an accused's
to a fair trial is protected.
[11] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-The absence of
volition condemns an enforced confession; due process requires
that it be given voluntarily and without promise of immunity
or reward.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of second
degree murder, reversed.
Robert H. Aarons for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Elizabeth Miller and
Albert Bianchi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant, Nellard Berve, appeals from a
judgment of conviction of murder in the second degree after
a trial without a jury. His claim is that the coercive circumstances attending his confession rendered its use at the trial
violative of the principles of due process of law, and accordingly his conviction must fall. For the reasons stated below
we find this contention meritorious.
Defendant was alleged to have performed an abortion on
one Mary M. Pettit. As a result of using unsterilized instruments an infection developed in Mrs. Pettit that could not be
cured and subsequently caused her death. The evidence,
excluding defendant's confession, tended to show that defendant performed the abortion. If believed, it would be sufficient
to support a finding of guilt.
At the trial a confession made by the defendant was introduced into evidence over his objection that the confession was
not voluntary. The objection was overruled and the confession was admitted.
The following uncontroverted circumstances surround the
making of the confession.
Defendant was kidnaped at rifle point by Harry Pettit, the
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victim's husband. He was threatened with imminent death by
a vengeful man who believed defendant had aborted his wife
and caused her death. Holding a rifle to defendant's head,
Pettit forced the defendant to drive to a strange house. Other
relatives of Mrs. Pettit bent on revenge were there. Pettit
showed the defendant a bullet from the rifle and told him that
it was "his" bullet if he did not confess to killing Mrs. Pettit.
He commanded the defendant to stare at the bullet for long
periods while Pettit threatened his life. Pettit drummed it
into the defendant's mind that he must confess or die. Pettit
also threatened defendant's parents with dire consequences
if they did anything in his defense. Then while Pettit pointed
his rifle at the defendant, another man beat him with his fists.
For almost two hours defendant was kicked and slugged with
shoes, fists and furniture. A glass object was hurled at him.
The kidnapers pushed his head through a window, cutting him.
Pettit struck him in the groin with his rifle butt and hit him
other places with it. Defendant received many blows on the
head. This treatment terrorized, numbed, nauseated and
caused defendant great pain. During this period the defendant was constantly reminded that unless he confessed he would
be murdered.
In corroboration of this testimony, Officer Peterson, the
arresting officer, testified that when he arrived on the scene
he observed defendant's condition and that he was bleeding,
bruised, perspiring and in a disheveled state. He saw Harry
Pettit seated on a chair in front of defendant with a gun
in his hands. He knew that defendant had been brought to
the house at the point of a gun. He had seen defendant about
two hours earlier and knew that his injuries had been inflicted
in the meantime.
Defendant's reaction to being rescued from his tormentors
by the police was one of relief.
The police arrested the defendant, handcuffed him and removed him to the police station. He arrived at the station
between 7 :30 and 7 :45 p. m. and the interview leading to his
confession began at 8 :11 p. m. Defendant did not receive
medical attention or have an opportunity to rest or wash himself. He was given only one cup of water before his confession
was complete. During the interview he was so confused that
he showed complete temporal disor-ientation. Defendant testified that he was fatigued, numb, confused and in increasing
pain during the entire interview. He testified that he could
51 C.2d-10

290
recall many of the
'Wore
reeonled. He te:.;tified
ll
and
his Jlal'HltS from fnr!llf•r ai j
One or the
offieers reminded him thaL he
to
" Defendant testified that
the interview: ''I \Vould have
with
in the world
let alonr. I would
have said 'Yes' to
in the world if
had let me
down and let me rest.''
'l'he only evidenec offered to contradid a condusion ol' coercion was the
of Officer
who stated that
defendant was not dazed when rescued and that
confession
vvas free and
''as far as he could observe.'' In view
of Officer Peterson's observations of defendant's
his knowledge of Harry Pettit's
gesi nres toward
defendant
brandishing a deadly weapon, and defendant's
visible injuries such a statement is not
[1] The usc of confessions in a crimiual
obtained by force,
promise of
or reward constitutes a denial of due process of Jaw both under the federal
and state Constitutions requiring a reycrsal of the emwiction
although other evidenee may be eom;i,tent with
(Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
28i:l-286
S.Ct. LJGJ, 80 LEd.
G82] ; Ashcraft v.
322 U.S. 143
S.Ct. 921, 88
hE d. 1192] ; JJialinski v. N cw York, 324 U.S. 401 jG5 S.Ct.
781, 89 L.Ed. 1029]; People v.
103 Cal. 387, 394 [%
P. 863]; see People v.
27 Cn1.2d 7 [161 P.2d
934] .) "Usc of involuntary verbal tonfessions in State criminal trials is eonstitnlionally obnoxious 11ot
because of
their nnrcliability. They are inadmis;,ible uwler the Due
Process Clause even though statemenls em1tained in them may
be independently established as true. Coer,•ed cou fessions
offend the commuuity's sense of fair
and
Nothing would be more calculated io dis(~redit law and thereby
to brutalize the temper of a
''
· Y.
342 U.S. 165, 173-174 [72 S.Ct. 205, D6 hEd. 1
2,) A.L.R.2d
1396].)
[2] As a reviewing court it is our duty to
uncontradicted fads to determine
trial court's conclusion of voluntar-iness was
found.
(Brown v.
supra, 297 U.S. at 287; Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228-229
S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716] ;
Liscnba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237-238 [ 62 S.Ct. 280,
86 LEd. 166] ;
v.
supra, 322 U.S. at 147148; Malinski v. New York, supra, 324l:'.S. at 404; Stroble v.
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190 [72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872] ;
356 U.S. 3GO [78 S.Ct.
847,
609 [150 P.2d
24 Cal.2d
[6 P.2d 313].)
that the
eon fession was
intimidation
22 Cal.2d 787, 804 [141 P.2d
supra, 24 Cnl.2cl at 608.)
"nwutnl frC'edom" in eon fcssing
or whethrr the
eonfession \YilS the
of free ehoiee (Payne v. Slate
supm, 78 S.Ct. at 830). "The sliuhtest pressure,
inducement to
or threat if eonto re(ruire the exclusion of
fesslon is wi1
added; People v.
supm,
the eonfes'Oion. ''
153 Cal. at :W4.)
'l'he prmwn1iion must show that sueh
cocreive eondi:
no longer prevailcJ at the
time i he (·OJ>fession
v. ,Johnson, 41 Cal.
452, 4;'Ji) i
V.
, 159 Cal. G, 14-15 [112 P. 720, Ann.
suz1ra, 2:1 Cal.2d at 609.)
Cas. 1912B 1193];
[6] Exmuiuing the lllll'ontradil·tcd eYidence Vie conelude
failed to show that the obYions coerthat the prosceui iou
ciye tiremnstanccs
to defendant',; eonfcssion had ceased
to exist in the min(1 of the (1efcnclant at the time he uttered
his COlllCSI>ion.
Then) is HO
threats of his torturers that he
would he killea if he did not eon.fc,;s and that his parents
\\:ould be harmed if
aided him ~were obliterated before
his confcs;sion. Fear of his own life and those of his parents,
the cffPe1s of hi:'
torture and his
eoufuserl menial
hovered over the accused during this
eon fes·-;ion, H hn';
h('l<1 that the tlweat of mere arrest
i o ! ai H t a (~onfession extracted
of one's mo~lwr is
on <·on,;liiniional
Y. Jfcllus, 134
CaLApp. 21(), 22:3-226
l'.2(t 237]; see
v. Shelton,
151
, 588 [:311 P.2c1
.) [7] Where there
pf mob Yiolz•nee
a confession
id ou due proeess grounds. (ChamCS. at 240;
v. 8tate of
. ) Tn the absenc:c of a showco:'n:wn no
inf!ncnced dea c:onfessiou two
after giYiug of induc:cments

supra, 322 U.S. at 1
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and assurances that a ''clear case'' existed against accused is
invalid. (People v. Johnson, supra, 41 Cal. at 455.) A confession made to two sheriffs one day after a beating by other
persons was struck down in Brown v. JJJississippi, S1tpra, 297
U.S. 278. In the light of the above cases, it must be held that
the continuing threat of death to himself and harm to his
parents infected defendant's confession.
[8] The actual physical and psychological effects of the
beating the defendant absorbed were painfully fresh when
he confessed. The police made no effort to assuage his physical
suffering by giving him medical attention, opportunity to rest,
or even sufficient water to drink or to wash himself. Although
there was no threat of further violence by the police, this
element was provided by the clear threats of his kidnapers.
Torture destroys not only physically but psychologically. Elements of despair, fatigue, craving for companionship, identifying one's interrogator as a friend and source of aid, and
suggestions of guilt were all present in a crude, haphazard
form in this case. 'rhey are the prime elements in the more
devious and elaborate systems of menticide employed to obtain
confession in totalitarian states. (See Sen. Rep. No. 2832,
84th Cong., 2d Scss., ''Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners," esp. p. 3 ct seq. on the "Hussian Sy;;tem. ") Defendant's physical and mental exhaustion ·were coordinate factors
in invalidating the confessions in Lcyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
[74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948]. To say defcndant'f> confession
was freely and voluntarily given is to say that none of these
clements extended from his physical ordeal to his police interrogation. It seems doubtful that the defendant would have
readily confessed if he had been arrested before he had been
mistreated by Pettit and his associates.
[9] Testimony of defendant at the trial in which he asserted his relief at being rescued by police officers from the
vengeful relatives of Mrs. Pettit is not susceptible to the inference that the subsequent confession was voluntary. The preeise purpose in threatening the defendant was to force a
confession. 'rhe two-hour inquisition was to instill in defendant such a fear for his own safety and that of his parent;; that
he >Yonld confes;.; to proper authorities although removed from
immediate danger. Tlm:::, merely liberating the defendant
eould not wipe out the threat::: of violence ringing in his cars
if he did not confess. 'l'he price exacted for freedom from
future reprisals was a confession. Momentary police sanctuary
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eould not still defrndant's terror unless
by
promises of effective police protedion. Only thrn can there
be grounds for assuming that Hw dd'('ndant has freedom of
choice.
[10] No valid grounds for distinction are to be found in
the fact that the coercion iu this case was iuflicted by eivilians,
and not the police. Decisions holding that confessions are
inadmissible because thry were rendered under eonditions of
threatened mob violence
civilians against an accused dearly
imply such conelusion. (Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 [43
S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543}; Wkite v. State, 129 Miss. 182 [91
So. 903, 24 A.L.R. 699] ; Tmrnp Y. State, 104 Neb. 222 [176
N.\V. 543] ; see eases collected 24 A.L.R. 706.) 'rhe prohibition
which bars the use of involuntary confessions is 11ot only designed as a regulation of the conduct of police offieers, but
also to insure that an aecused 's right to a fair trial is protected. (Roehin v. California, supra, 342 U.S. at 173-174.)
[11] The absence of volition eond0mns an enforced confession. Due process requires that it be given voluntarily and
without promise of immunity or reward. On the record before
us the confession here must be excluded.
All the purported appeals from nonappealable orders listed
in the notice of appeal are dismissed. The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., 'rraynor, J., and Schauer, J., coneurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. In my opinion, a review of the
entire record, including the testimouy of Deputy Sheriff Peterson, corroborated by the statements of the defendant himself,
shows that the evidenee -vvas sufficient to j nstify the court
in finding, as it did, that the confession of defendant was free
and voluntary. There can be no question of defendant's guilt.
I would affirm the judgment.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., eoncurred.
Hespondent 's petition for a rehearing wa~; denied Dec-ember
30, 1958. Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

